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Abstract
Cost inefficiencies in public procurement tend to come from two sources: corruption
(moral hazard) and incompetence (adverse selection). In most countries, audit authorities are
responsible for monitoring costs but do not distinguish both sources of inefficiency in their
audits. Judicial courts typically rely on these cost audits, but only sanction corruption. In a
model of public procurement by politicians, we study how the respective quality of the two
courts affects corruption as well as cost efficiency. We find that while better courts have the
direct effect of decreasing corruption, they may have a negative indirect effect on the abilities
of the pool of politicians, so that the net effect on cost efficiency is ambiguous.
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1 Introduction
Public procurement represents a very significant share of the value added in every country in the
world. In OECD countries, 15 to 25% of GDP is typically composed of government purchases
of goods, equipment, and services; public works; studies; and other activities needed to deliver
public services.1 Cost inefficiencies are common in these markets, and whether they arise because
of corruption, incompetence or simply bad luck often remains an open question. A 2014 study by
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PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) for the European Union (EU) estimates that bid rigging in public
procurement affects 48% of auctions.2 The inefficiencies arising from corruption and incompe-
tence in procurement represent 10 to 30% of the costs of publicly funded construction projects
(OECD, 2016).
In most countries, a key element of the policies adopted to reduce the risks of corrupt and
incompetent practices is reliance on internal government controls (OECD, 2016). Such controls
tend to be housed within the procurement entities themselves but are also often complemented by
independent government auditing units.3 In 2014, the European Court of Auditors (ECA)4 iden-
tified problems in about 40% of the procurement projects undertaken with EU funds. As only
corruption is actually illegal, it is generally rational for any individual involved in an action iden-
tified by auditors as irregular to claim incompetence rather than dishonesty. To find a politician or
political appointee guilty, therefore, the assessment of an accounting court must be complemented
by the assessment of a judge.
In this paper, we analyze the respective influence of the quality of the judicial system and
the accounting courts on the cost efficiency of public procurement. We find that increasing the
quality of both courts helps decrease procurement costs when the main driver of high costs is
corruption. When the main problem is incompetence, however, better courts sometimes make
things worse. These results are driven by the skills and honesty of the politicians (or political
appointees) responsible for the management of the procurement process. This insight contributes
to the literature on the endogenous selection of politicians (Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Besley,
2005; Poutvaara and Takalo, 2007). It does so by taking into account the difficulties of identifying
the source of cost overruns (Bandiera et al., 2009), focusing on the need to distinguish between
incompetence and corruption and on the role of judicial and accounting courts in improving the
overall efficiency of procurement.
We assume that citizens differ in ability and choose when to join the pool of politicians or
political appointees (denoted through the paper as “politicians”). We treat ability as a single di-
mension, so that more able politicians have a higher opportunity cost of being in office (a standard
assumption in the literature). We also assume that more able politicians are more often in a po-
sition to benefit from corruption. One reason for this is that they have a better understanding of
2PwC (2014), Public Procurement: costs we pay for corruption.
3For instance, the Government Accountability Office for the U.S. federal government, the National Audit Office in
the United Kingdom, the Cour des Comptes in France or Belgium, and the Tribunal de Cuentas in Spain. Herein we use
the term “court” to refer to such audit authorities, contrasting, for example, “accounting courts” with “judicial courts.”
4European Court of Auditors (2014), Audit of public procurement by the European Court of Auditors, Berlin,
November 14.
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the process, which is directly linked to the ability to manage it. Another is that they are more
likely to have connections at a higher levels: Gagliarducci et al., 2010 for instance, show that in
Italy high-income citizens entering politics tend to be less dedicated than those of more modest
means and to make more money from outside activities.5 Our distinction between incompetence
and corruption is very close to the idea of active and passive waste in Bandiera et al. (2009), who
show that 83% of the waste in public purchases of standardized goods in Italian municipalities is
the consequence of passive waste, described as a combination of incompetence and the costs of
regulation. In Russia, Best et al. (2017) show that more than half of the variation in prices paid for
an identical good can be explained by differences in ability of the bureaucrats.
While we find that the direct effect of both better judicial and accounting courts is to decrease
the probability of corruption, we also identify indirect and possibly detrimental effects on the
ability of politicians. Good judges may decrease the quality of the pool of politicians for three
reasons. First, because better judges decrease the probability of being wrongfully convicted for
corruption, they protect the least able politicians and make politics more attractive to them. Sec-
ond, as the least able politicians have fewer opportunities to benefit from corruption, better judges
decrease the relative advantage of the most able politicians if corruption is an important share of
politicians’ income. Third, if corruption is not an important source of income, better judges make
politics more attractive to the marginal citizen, indifferent between entering politics or not. If the
most able citizens are politicians, the marginal politician is of lesser ability than the average and
her entry decreases the quality of the pool. This last effect is reminiscent of the possibility of
a detrimental impact of wages on the quality of politicians documented in Poutvaara and Takalo
(2007).
Better accounting courts may similarly lower the quality of the pool of politicians for two
reasons. First, as with good judges, good accounting courts may decrease the relative benefit of
highly able citizens if corruption is an important source of income. Second, better accounting
courts decrease the share of judicial mistakes affecting higher-ability citizens, but raise the share
of mistakes affecting the least able citizens. If only the least able citizens enter politics and the
marginal politician is of low ability, better accounting courts make politics less attractive to her,
and the quality of politicians decrease.
More generally, we find that an “ideal” institutional design combines sufficiently good ac-
counting courts, high punishment for corrupt politicians and, somewhat counter intuitively, suffi-
5The idea that more able politicians have more room for corruption is at the basis of the so-called “tradeoff hypoth-
esis” (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013) according to which some voters would be willing to accept more corruption in
exchange of more competence.
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ciently bad judicial courts responsible for punishing corrupt politicians. Within this institutional
framework, we also show the local conditions under which expected procurement costs can be cut
through a marginal increase in the quality of the two types of courts, a change in the wages of
politicians and more severe levels of punishment.
These broad conclusions rest on four important modeling assumptions which we relax in var-
ious extensions of the model. First, we assume that each citizen choosing to become a politician
is elected with equal probability, implying that voters cannot screen based on skills. We show in
section 6.1 that assuming, instead, that voters screen the most able candidates would mechanically
decrease the importance of the selection problem.6 The extent to which voters actually assess
the competence of their politicians is thus crucial but easily overestimated. For instance, Todorov
et al. (2005) show that “inferences of competence, based solely on the facial appearance of politi-
cal candidates and with no prior knowledge about the person, predict the outcomes of elections for
the U.S. Congress even after voters were given the possibility to correct their vote after receiving
additional information on politicians’ competence.”7 Hence, unless voters manage to correctly
identify the most able citizens by assessing their physical appearance,8 elections alone do not
suffice to screen the most able candidates.
Second, we define an increase in the quality of a court as a symmetric decrease in the share of
false positives and false negatives in its judgments. In practice, this corresponds to giving more
resources or autonomy to those courts. Alternatively, it is possible to study the severity of courts,
defined as decreasing the number of false negatives at the cost of increasing the number of false
positives. We show in section 6.2 that judicial severity does not affect the pool of politicians in the
same way as judicial quality. In other words, while better judges make politics more attractive to
the least able citizens, more severe judges make politics less attractive to everyone.
Third, we consider ability as a single dimension: a more able politician is better at delivering
public goods at low cost, has more outside options, and is more often in a position to benefit
from bribes. In section 6.3, we study a variant of the model in which the ability to benefit from
corruption is independent from the ability to deliver projects at low cost. In that case, the least able
6The same holds for corruption. A study of Brazil by Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2013) concludes that the lack
of credible information on corruption explains the inability of voters to punish it. The question of how voters should
gather such information remains open, however, as discussed for instance by Lambert-Mogiliansky (2015).
7A perhaps even more striking example is given in Antonakis and Dalgas (2009), who show that a sample of children
asked to choose the ideal “captain of their boat” from a picture predicted correctly 71% of the results of the French
parliamentary elections, with a rate of successful prediction that was undistinguishable from that of adults.
8The problem we study would matter less if the beauty premium (see also Hamermesh et al., 1994) is a strong
predictor of the ability to deliver a public procurement project at low cost. Berggren et al. (2010), show that perception
of competence and beauty are strongly correlated; Berggren et al. (2017) demonstrate that physical appearance also
helps identify the ideology of a candidate.
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politicians are the ones who accept the most bribes, because they know that, without corruption,
they are more likely to deliver at high cost and to be victims of judicial errors. Even in this case,
it remains possible for better courts to lower the quality of the pool of politicians, because of the
degree to which better judges protect the least able politicians from judicial errors.
Fourth, we rule out the fact that some politicians are genuinely honest and derive no utility
from bribes (defined broadly to cover conflicts of interests). In section 6.4, we consider politicians
with different preferences for corruption. If the most able politicians are also more honest, they
are also hurt less by a decrease in corruption, neutralizing one of the reasons why better courts
may lower the ability of politicians.
We review the relevant literature in the next section. Section 3 presents the model and the
equilibrium of the game. We provide comparative statics on the impact of the quality of the
different courts in Section 4. Section 5 studies the impact of policy changes on cost efficiency,
corruption and the share of judicial errors. We discuss the robustness of our results to different
assumptions in section 6 and conclude in section 7.
2 Related Literature
Our contribution looks into institutional failures that allow inept and corrupt politicians to improve
their career prospects and, in so doing, to degrade the cost efficiency of public projects – either
directly or through their appointees. The core relevance of corruption for the optimal design of
procurement has already been discussed by Søreide (2002), Compte et al. (2005), Auriol (2006),
and Estache (2011) to cite just a few studies.
Our focus is on the interaction of incentives for corruption and incentives to become a politi-
cian. Early attempts to study the endogenous quality of the pool of these actors go back to Besley
and Coate (1997) and Besley and Coate (1998).9 Our model relates even more closely to five
more recent papers. Caselli and Morelli (2004) study the endogenous pool of politicians in the
presence of heterogeneous ability and corruption. They emphasize the reputation externalities of
politicians with respect to each other. Besley and Smart (2007) consider the selection of politi-
cians with heterogeneous preference for corruption. They show that better auditing - modelled as
a technology transmitting information about corruption to voters - may lead to higher corruption
by giving more incentives to corrupt politicians to steal in a first term, as they know they are less
likely to be reelected. Poutvaara and Takalo (2007) show that higher pay for political offices (or
9See also the survey by Besley (2005).
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lower campaigning costs) may raise the quality of politicians if only the least able citizens are
candidate, but may lower it if the most able are already participating. Mattozzi and Merlo (2008)
also predict that higher compensation may lower the quality of politicians by broadening the base
of citizens it attracts, while Gagliarducci et al. (2010) predict that more able politicians are also
more likely to shirk.
Our main interest is to know how institutions are and should be designed to generate the right
incentives. Part of the literature has identified various ways in which voting systems can interfere
ex-ante with the election of politicians. For instance, Myerson (1993) studied the impact of elec-
toral systems on the incentives for corruption, Smart and Sturm (2013) the impact of term limits
on the ability of politicians and Ferraz and Finan (2011) the impact of electoral accountability (the
possibility of being reelected) on corruption in Brazilian municipalities.
Salaries have attracted the broadest interest among the determinants of the quality of politi-
cians. The wrong salary scales or the introduction of penalties for bad politicians may reduce
the pool of good politicians from which to choose. Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013) showed
for Italian municipalities that better salaries increase the quality of politicians. Ferraz and Finan
(2009) obtains similar results in Brazil. The evidence is mixed, however: Kotakorpi and Poutvaara
(2011) show with Finnish data that higher earnings did not necessarily lead to more qualified
politicians and Hoffman and Lyons (2015) find no significant link between pay, efficiency and cor-
ruption of U.S. state legislators and governors. Peichl et al. (2013) demonstrate that the claim that
politicians could earn significantly more in the private sector is not confirmed by data on German
politicians. Braendle (2015) finds that large increases in politicians’ wage had no effect on the
education level of the pool of members of the European Parliament. In Spain, Benito et al. (2014)
show that mayors who set a high salary for themselves are not more efficient. More generally, the
impact of public compensation on the corruption of civil servants remains an open question. In an
experimental setup, Van Veldhuizen (2013) shows that higher wages reduce the corruptibility of
officials, while Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang (2015) show that an ambitious hike in the salary of
public officials in Ghana actually worsened corruption.
3 Model
A procurement project has to be delivered. From this point forward, we do not distinguish between
elected politicians and their appointees, considering both groups as “politicians.” The politician
is randomly chosen from a pool of citizens applying to deliver the project (we explicitly model
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campaigning and elections in Section 6.1). Two possible sources of inefficiency can lead the
project to be delivered at high cost. The first is an adverse selection problem: politicians are
of unobservable ability. The second is a moral hazard problem: a competent politician may be
dishonest and deliver at high cost while retaining a share of the proceeds. We study the relative
impact of the quality of the judicial system (monitoring whether a politician is corrupt or not) and
of accounting courts (monitoring whether the project is delivered at high cost) on cost efficiency,
corruption and the rate of judicial errors. This section and the next one are positive, in the sense that
we take the different parameters resulting from a policy choice as given. Section 5 is normative, in
the sense that we consider a social planner endogenously choosing the said parameters to maximize
different objective functions.
3.1 Politicians
The players in the model are utility-maximizing risk-neutral citizens. A citizen is born with an
ability θi, drawn from a continuous distribution with density f (θ), cumulative density F and
support [0,1]. All citizens simultaneously choose whether or not to become politicians. Then,
one politician is picked randomly to deliver the project. The type of each individual is private
information; all the other exogenous parameters are common knowledge.
When in office, a politician discovers a state of the world µ ∈ {l,h}, reflecting the possibility
to deliver the project at low cost. With probability θi, the state is l, and the politician can deliver
the project at low cost, which is normalized at cl = 0. With probability 1−θi, the state is h and
the politician has no choice but to deliver the project at high cost ch > cl . This probability is
exogenous and reflects the competence of a politician: being more competent means being more
often in position to deliver the project at low cost.
If the state is l the politician also privately observes her opportunity to engage in corruption and
steal s, drawn from a continuous distribution with density g(s), cumulative density G and support
[0,1]. The politician can then either choose not to be guilty of corruption (ng) and to actually
deliver the project at low cost cl , or to be guilty (g) and deliver at high cost while stealing a share
s of the excess cost ch.10 A politician thus chooses above which level of s (if any) to engage in
corruption. An important assumption is that, ex-ante, for a given density g(s), a politician who
is more competent to deliver the project is also more often in the position to steal, because she is
more often in position to deliver the project at low cost. We relax this assumption in Section 6.3,
10We do not consider the possibility for a politician to steal less and deliver the project strictly between low and
high cost. As we assume the realized cost of an honest politician to be binary, any such intermediary cost would reveal
corruption with certainty in our setup and therefore never be part of an equilibrium strategy.
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and show that doing so removes one of the channel through which better courts may lower the
quality of politicians.
The competence of a politician is also reflected in her opportunity cost of working in politics,
expressed by her remuneration in office net of her outside option, w(θi). We make the assumption
that ∂w∂θ < 0 and, in most of the analysis
∂ 2w
∂θ 2 = 0, so that
∂w
∂θ is the marginal increase in the oppor-
tunity cost of being in office when being more competent. This assumption drives the selection
problem: a more talented citizen, being more talented both inside and outside of politics, has a
higher opportunity cost by becoming a politician.
The strategy of a citizen is a double {E,s}, where E ∈ { j,n j} is the decision of whether ( j) or
not (n j) to join the pool of politicians, and s∈ [0,1] is the level above which a politician under state
l prefers to steal (g) than to deliver a project at low cost (ng). A strategy {E∗,s∗} is an equilibrium
for a citizen of type θi if Uθi(E∗,s∗)≥Uθi(E,s) for all {E,s}.
3.2 The judicial system
Once the project is delivered, two courts release an informative signal. First, the accounting court
releases a signal ωa ∈ {l,h} on the cost of the project (low or high). The signal is informative and
correct with probability p ∈ (1/2,1). Formally, for a given project, Pr[ch | ωa = h] = Pr[cl | ωa =
l] = p and Pr[ch | ωa = l] = Pr[cl | ωa = h] = 1− p.
If and only if the project cost is reported as high, the judicial system releases a signal ω j ∈
{c,nc}, correct with probability q ∈ (1/2,1), on whether the politician is corrupt (c) or not (nc).
Formally, for a given project, Pr[g | ω j = c] = Pr[ng | ω j = nc] = q and Pr[g | ω j = nc] = Pr[ng |
ω j = c] = 1−q.
The politician is convicted and receives a utility punishment of γ > 0 if and only if both courts
find her guilty (ωa = h,ω j = c). The parameters p and q reflect the respective quality of the two
judicial institutions and, like the punishment γ , are exogenous until Section 5. By “quality,” we
have in mind measures such as the extent of financial resources or autonomy of the courts, so that
better courts generate fewer false positives and fewer false negatives. Better courts are not the
same as more severe courts, which would decrease the number of false negatives at the cost of
increasing the number of false positives. We study the latter in Section 6.2.
3.3 Timing of the game
To summarize, the timing is as follows:
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1. Citizens privately learn their ability θi out of a known distribution and decide whether or not
to become politicians.
2. Within the pool of politicians, one is chosen randomly to be in charge of the procurement
project.
3. The chosen politician privately observes whether the state of the world is l or h.
4. Conditional on observing a signal l, she privately notes her ability to steal s and chooses
whether or not to do so.
5. The two courts release their public evaluation. The politician is given a punishment γ if she
is found to have incurred high cost ωa = h and convicted of corruption ω j = c.
3.4 Equilibrium strategy
The expected utility of a citizen of type θi choosing a strategy { j,s∗}, to become a politician, and
to steal if and only if s≥ s∗, is given by
Uθi( j,s
∗) = w(θi)− (1−θi)γ p(1−q)+θi
(
−
∫ s∗
0
γ(1−q)(1− p)g(s)ds+
∫ 1
s∗
(sch− γqp)g(s)ds
)
(1)
The utility is the sum of the following four elements. First, the remuneration net of opportunity
cost w. Second, the expected punishment when the state of the world is h (with probability 1−θi),
and the politician is incompetent, delivering the project at high cost without dishonesty. The
politician is given a punishment γ when the project is correctly reported by the accounting court as
high cost (with probability p) and judges mistakenly find her to have been corrupt (with probability
1−q). Third, when the state is l (with probability θ ), for the lowest values of s, the politician has
little to gain from corruption and delivers the project at low cost (with probability G(s∗)θi). In that
case, she receives a punishment γ if both courts make a mistake, with probability (1−q)(1− p).
Finally, for the highest values of s, the politician chooses to accept corruption and steals a share s of
the cost difference ch, receiving punishment γ if both courts send a correct signal, with probability
pq.
A citizen who plays a strategy {n j,s} receives utility normalized to U(n j,s) = 0 for all values
of s, since she does not join the pool of politicians.
We want to identify the citizens for whom Uθi( j,s
∗)≥ 0, who constitute the equilibrium pool
of politicians. For this, we must first identify s∗, the threshold value above which politicians start
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stealing.
Lemma 1 At equilibrium, a politician in a state of the world µ = l prefers to steal whenever
s≥ sˆ = γ(p+q−1)ch , so that
s∗ =
 sˆ iff sˆ ∈ [0,1]1 iff sˆ≥ 1.
The formal proof is in the Appendix. Conditional on entry, the probability that a politician of
type θi accepts a bribe is given by
S(θi) = θi (1−G(s∗)) , (2)
so that ∂S∂θ > 0. The fact that in a given set of politicians the more talented steal more is a direct
consequence of the fact that they have more opportunity to do so. However, more talented politi-
cians also deliver more often at low cost so that, unless a social planner is interested in fighting
corruption as a matter of principle, it should always prefer, all other things held equal, higher
quality politicians.
In order to obtain closed form solutions it is useful to simplify the problem by assuming that
w(θ) is linear, with the remuneration from politics net of opportunity cost of the least able citizen
w(0) = wo and the marginal increase in the opportunity cost of being in office for higher types
∂w
∂θ = −w¯. For a citizen of type θi the decision of whether to enter the pool of politicians Uθi ≥ 0
is derived directly from (1),
θi
(
γ(1−q)(2p−1)+
∫ 1
s∗
ch(s− s∗)g(s)ds− w¯
)
≥ γ(1−q)p−w0. (3)
The impact of competence on willingness to enter the pool of active politicians is ambiguous.
On the one hand, being of greater competence decreases the incentives to enter, as more able
politicians have a higher opportunity cost. On the other hand, it increases the incentives to enter,
as one has a lower risk of being convicted while behaving honestly, and more opportunities to be
dishonest. While judicial and accounting courts have comparable effects on individual corruption,
they have a different impact on judicial errors. An increase in the quality of judicial courts q is
of more benefit to the less competent, who tend not to be guilty of corruption, while an increase
in p may yield greater benefit to either type, as it decreases their probability of being falsely
convicted when the probability of producing at low cost is higher, but it also forgoes the benefits
from corruption.
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We can define the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of being a politician of a higher type.
The marginal benefit is given by
MBθ = γ(1−q)(2p−1)+
∫ 1
s∗
ch(s− s∗)g(s)ds. (4)
The impact of the quality of the judicial system on the marginal benefit of being a high type is
always negative, ∂MBθ∂q =−γ ((2p−1)− (1−G(s∗))g(s∗))< 0. Indeed, the derivative of the first
term of equation (4) with respect to q is negative, and by Lemma 1 we know that ∂ s
∗
∂q =
γ
ch
> 0. The
impact of the quality of the accounting court ∂MBθ∂ p = γ (2(1−q)− (1−G(s∗))g(s∗)) is ambiguous
however, as the derivative of the first term of equation (4) with respect to p is positive whereas the
derivative with respect to the second term is negative.
The marginal cost of being a politician of higher type is given by the increase in the opportunity
cost of being in office
MCθ = w¯, (5)
and is a constant as we have assumed w(θ) to be linear.
Finally, using the linear form of w(θ), the payoff to a politician in office of the lowest possible
ability θi = 0 can be written as
U0( j) = w0− γ(1−q)p, (6)
with ∂U0( j)∂q > 0 and
∂U0( j)
∂ p < 0. The politician with the lowest possible ability is never corrupt, as
she never has the opportunity to produce at a low cost. For that reason, judges of higher quality
always benefit her. But because she always produces at a high cost, accounting courts of higher
quality always decrease her payoff from holding when in office.
For the entire analysis, we study the problem in terms of U0( j), MBθ and MCθ , so that the
payoff of a citizen of type θi joining politics is
Uθi( j,s
∗) =U0( j)+θi(MBθ −MCθ ). (7)
Using (7) we can then define the indifferent type θˆ as the solution to the following equality:
θˆ =
−U0( j)
MBθ −MCθ . (8)
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We can now formally present the equilibrium strategy of citizens.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, either only the most able or the least able citizens enter politics.
The equilibrium strategy of a given citizen is a pair {E,s∗}. The corruption threshold s∗ is defined
in Lemma 1. If MBθ > MCθ , E = j for all θi ≥ θ− = max{θˆ ,0}. If MBθ < MCθ , E = j for all
θi ≤ θ+ = min{θˆ ,1}.
The proof is presented in the Appendix. Depending on whether the marginal benefit of being
of a higher type is greater than the marginal cost, the pool of politicians consists entirely of either
only the most able or the least able citizens, but never of disjoint subsets of [0,1]. The game
can also lead to corner solutions where either all or no citizens enter. When MBθ → MCθ , the
denominator of (8) goes to zero. This implies that for MBθ > MCθ the condition goes to θ ≥ ∞
if and only if U0( j) < 0 (no citizens enter) and θ ≥ −∞ if and only if U0( j) > 0 (all citizens
enter). Similarly, for MBθ < MCθ the condition goes to θ ≤ −∞ if and only if U0( j) < 0 (no
citizens enter) and θ ≤ ∞ if and only if U0( j)> 0 (all citizens enter). This implies a continuity in
the equilibrium quality of the pool of politicians because, depending on the value of U0( j) at this
point, either all or no citizens choose to enter politics around the values at which MBθ = MCθ .
Note that the assumption of opportunity cost linear with ability is critical for the result that only
one threshold value of θ determines who joins the pool of politicians. More general functions
could lead to disconnected intervals of θi entering politics. While this is clearly a limitation of our
approach, the marginal impact of the various parameters on each politician is not affected by this
assumption.
In the next section, we study how the equilibrium is affected by the quality of the two types of
courts.
4 Analysis
We consider first the impact of the quality of the judicial and accounting courts on the quality of
the pool of politicians. We then examine the impact on cost efficiency and the aggregate level of
corruption.
4.1 The effect of court quality on the pool of politicians
The following proposition characterizes the effect of the quality of judges on the competence of
active politicians.
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Proposition 2 When only the most able citizens enter politics (MBθ > MCθ ), the average ability
of the pool of politicians drops when the quality of the signal sent by judges q rises if and only
if θˆ ≤− ∂U0( j)/∂q∂MBθ/∂q =
p
(2p−1)+g(s∗)(1−G(s∗)) . When only the least able citizens enter politics (MBθ <
MCθ ), the average ability of politicians decreases with q if and only if θˆ ≥− ∂U0( j)/∂q∂MBθ/∂q .
The formal proof is presented in the Appendix. The two cases are not exogenous: because
∂MBθ
∂q < 0 and
∂MCθ
∂q = 0, changes in the quality of judges q affect whether the most (MBθ > MCθ )
or the least (MBθ < MCθ ) able citizens enter politics. Regardless of the case, a change in q affects
politicians in two ways. The first derives from the fact that ∂MBθ∂q < 0 and is a selection effect:
better quality signals sent by judicial courts decrease the advantage of being a more able politi-
cian, as the relative advantage derives from avoiding more judicial errors while innocent and from
being able to steal more often. This effect decreases the utility of all politicians, but it particu-
larly affects the most able among them. The second effect derives from ∂U0∂q > 0 and is an entry
effect: the presence of judges of higher quality makes it safer overall to be a politician (stealing
is always a choice). Assume for a moment that MBθ > MCθ . If the first effect predominates for
the “threshold” politician indifferent between entering or not, this politician is worse off when q
increases. This implies that fewer citizens enter the pool of politicians and that those politicians
are of higher quality. If the second effect predominates, the “threshold” politician is made better
off by the higher quality of judges: hence more politicians (of lesser ability) enter. All other things
held equal, the first effect is more likely to predominate if the threshold politician is of a high type
(as she has more to lose). Assuming now that MBθ < MCθ , if the first effect predominates, fewer
citizens enter politics and the average quality decreases because only the least able citizens enter,
while the opposite is true if the second effect predominates.
It is possible to rewrite the condition in Proposition 2 to show that the threshold politician is
made better off by an increase in q if and only if
(1− θˆ)p+ θˆ(1− p)≥ θˆ (1−G(s∗))g(s∗). (9)
The left-hand side decreases with the threshold politician’s ability θˆ and represents the benefits of
the possibility of being found innocent more often when q increases. As politicians of greater abil-
ity are less often in state h, where the probability of being convicted while non-corrupt is higher,
they benefit less from this effect. The right-hand side is the loss of the benefits of corruption. As
the higher types benefit more often from bribes in equilibrium, the negative impact on them is
higher. Note that without corruption (s∗→ 1) an increase in q always benefits everyone. It is only
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Figure 1.A: γ = 5, p = 0.8, w¯ = 0.5, w0 = 0.5
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Figure 1.B: γ = 2, p = 0.7, w¯ = 1, w0 = 0.6
Figure 1: Comparative statics on the quality of the judicial system q, with ch = γ and G(s) = s. The share of
corruption opportunities refused is s∗ , σ the share of projects affected by corruption, λ the share of projects delivered
at low cost, θ− the marginal citizen when MBθ > MCθ , θ+ the marginal citizen when MBθ < MCθ .
because it decreases the benefits from corruption that some more able politicians may be worse of
when the quality of the signal sent by judges increases.
We illustrate the effect of the quality of judicial courts q in Figure 1, in two different contexts.11
The gray area represents the range of ability of the politicians at equilibrium. Figure 1.A aims at
representing a country with relatively favourable conditions: a relatively narrow dispersion of
the opportunity cost of being in office w¯, high punishment when convicted γ , and a relatively
competent accounting court p. From the left border to the mark line, MBθ > MCθ so that all
citizens of ability greater than θ− enter politics. To the right of the mark line, MBθ < MCθ , and
only politicians with ability lower than θ+ enter (remember that MBθ always decreases with q).
For the lowest values of q, corruption is relatively widespread when the state of the world is l
(low s∗), and the “threshold” politician θˆ is of relatively high ability. Hence, when q increases the
threshold politician is made slightly worse off, so that the marginally less able citizens leave the
pool of politicians. For intermediate values of q, politics becomes more and more attractive for the
least able citizens, as they are less likely to be the subject of a judicial error, up to the point where
all citizens join the pool of politicians.
Figure 1.B corresponds to much less favourable conditions: a higher dispersion of opportu-
nity costs of being in office, lower punishment when convicted, and a relatively less competent
accounting court. For the lowest values of q, no citizen wants to enter, as the risk of being mistak-
11For all figures, we use a uniform distribution for s, so that if sˆ ≤ 1, θˆ = − 2ch(w0+γ p(q−1))c2h−2ch(γ p(2q−1)+w¯)+γ2(p+q−1)2 and if
sˆ > 1, θˆ = w0+γ p(q−1)γ(2p−1)(q−1)+w¯ .
14
enly sanctioned is too high for everyone. When q increases, some citizens of low ability begin to
enter, and the quality of the pool of politicians increases in inverse proportion to the risk of being
erroneously convicted, while corruption falls.
Finally, both figures point to a role of the marginal politician that is reminiscent of Poutvaara
and Takalo (2007). When only the most able citizens enter politics, making the profession more
financially attractive decreases the quality of politicians. When only the least able enter, making
politics more attractive increases the quality of politicians.
Proposition 3 When only the most able citizens enter politics (MBθ > MCθ ), the average ability
of the pool of politicians decreases as the quality of the signal sent by the accounting court p
increases if and only if θˆ ≤ − ∂U0( j)/∂ p∂MBθ/∂ p =
1−q
(1−q)−g(s∗)(1−G(s∗)) . When only the least able enter
(MBθ < MCθ ), the average ability of politicians decreases with p if and only if θˆ ≥− ∂U0( j)/∂ p∂MBθ/∂ p .
The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2 in the Appendix. Politicians are affected in two
ways as the quality of the signal sent by the accounting court p increases. The first effect is a
selection effect, that may either be positive for all politicians, but relatively more so for the most
able, or negative for all politicians, but relatively less so for the least able. As better accounting
courts decrease corruption, and as politicians of higher ability accept more bribes, their utility loss
from lower corruption grows with p. However, a higher p makes it more likely that an honest
politician of low ability will be reported as having incurred a high cost, and less likely that an
honest politician of high ability will suffer the same fate. The second effect, an entry effect,
is negative for all politicians, as the probability of being caught when delivering at high cost is
higher.
When MBθ > MCθ : If the sum of the two effects is negative for the “threshold” politician in-
different between entering or not, this politician becomes worse off as p increases. Because when
MBθ > MCθ only the most able citizens become politicians, the pool of politicians is smaller and
of higher quality. This can be the case even if the first effect is positive but not large enough to
counterbalance the second. Similarly, when MBθ < MCθ , as only the least able citizens enter pol-
itics, if the payoff to the threshold politician decreases, the average quality of the pool decreases.
It is possible to rewrite the condition in Proposition 3 to show that the threshold politician is
made better off by an increase in the competence of accounting courts p if and only if
(1−q)(2θˆ −1)≥ θˆg(s∗)(1−G(s∗)). (10)
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The left-hand side is positive for the most able politicians θ ≥ 12 and represents the benefits of
a greater likelihood of being found innocent when the state of the world is l minus the cost of a
greater likelihood of being found guilty when the state of the world is h. As politicians of greater
ability are more often in state l, they benefit more from this effect. The right-hand side is the loss
from the benefits of corruption, identical to the loss created by an increase in the quality of judges
q. As the more able politicians benefit more often from bribes in equilibrium, the negative impact
on them is higher. Without corruption (s∗ → 1), an increase in p always benefits the most able
half of the politicians and hurts the others. Because an increase in p also decreases the benefits
from corruption, the actual level of θ at which politicians start benefiting from an increase in p is
higher. All politicians can even be made worse off if ∂MBθ∂ p ≤ 0.
p
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Figure 2.A: γ = 5, w¯ = 0.5, w0 = 0.3
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Figure 2.B: γ = 2, w¯ = 1, w0 = 0.6
Figure 2: Comparative statics on the quality of the accounting courts p, for q = 0.7, γ = ch and G(s) = s. The share
of corruption opportunities refused is s∗ , σ the share of projects affected by corruption, λ the share of projects
delivered at low cost, θ− the marginal citizen when MBθ > MCθ , θ+ the marginal citizen when MBθ < MCθ .
We illustrate the two effects in Figure 2. The gray area represents the range of ability of the
politicians entering the pool at equilibrium. Figure 2.A corresponds to what would intuitively be
favourable conditions: low dispersion of opportunity cost and severe punishment when convicted.
Hence, only the most able citizens choose to enter politics, MBθ > MCθ . For the lowest values of
p, the risk of being reported for having incurred high cost when in state h is not very high, so that
a large share of the least able citizens chooses to enter politics. Moreover, corruption is relatively
widespread. As p increases, corruption decreases, and the average ability of politicians begin to
rise as the risk to those of lower ability of being wrongfully convicted for high costs rises. Hence,
a higher p both increases the average ability of politicians and decreases corruption.
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Figure 2.B could represent a country facing what would intuitively be described as less favourable
conditions, where the marginal increase in the opportunity cost of being in office w¯ is higher, and
punishments for corruption γ are less severe. In this case, only the least able citizens enter politics,
MBθ < MCθ . Both the potential benefits ch from corruption and the costs γ of being convicted
are lower. For the lowest values of p, corruption is high, and the risk of being reported for high
costs while accepting bribes remains sufficiently low for some relatively able citizens to enter. As
p increases, the possibility of benefiting from bribes decreases, so that the most able citizens cease
to join the pool of politicians. Hence, raising p decreases corruption, but it also decreases the
average quality of the politicians.
4.2 The impact of court quality on procurement performance
a. Cost efficiency
It is now possible to analyse the effect of the quality of the judicial and accounting courts on the
probability that a project is delivered at a low cost. It is useful to define the expected ability of a
politician as θ¯ , with
θ¯ =

∫ 1
θ− θ f (θ)dθ
1−F(θ−) for MBθ > MCθ∫ θ+
0 θ f (θ)dθ
F(θ+) for MBθ < MCθ .
The equilibrium probability that a project is delivered at low cost is
λ = G(s∗)θ¯ (11)
The probability that a project is delivered at low cost is equal to the probability that a politician
does not steal when in state l, G(s∗), multiplied by the expected ability of a politician θ¯ , which is
equal to her probability of being in state l. The expected ability of a politician is derived directly
from Proposition 1.
Proposition 4 Courts of higher quality marginally increase the cost efficiency of procurement
projects if their possibly negative effect on the average ability of the pool of politicians, does not
outweigh their contribution to deterring corruption,
−∂ θ¯
∂ i
G(s∗)≤ ∂ s
∗
∂ i
g(s∗)θ¯ , (12)
with i ∈ {q, p}.
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Proof. The proof directly follows from deriving ∂λ∂q and
∂λ
∂ p , with λ defined in (11)
The left-hand side represents the loss of cost efficiency for a given level of corruption when
the pool of candidates is modified by the quality of the court. It is given by ∂ θ¯∂ i , the impact of
the quality of the court i ∈ {q, p} on the average ability of a politician, multiplied by G(s∗), the
probability that a given politician in state l refuses a bribe (with a minus sign).
The right-hand side represents the gain of cost efficiency for a given pool of politicians when
the rate of corruption s∗ is modified by the quality of the court. There may be a tradeoff between
the quality of the pool of politicians and the level of corruption. In particular, if higher quality
of the judicial or accounting court lowers the quality of the pool of politicians, the cost efficiency
of the projects may decrease even though the probability that a given politician will be corrupt
is lessened. The probability that a project will be delivered at low cost λ is represented in both
Figures 1 and 2, with F(θ) = θ . It is easy to see that the average cost efficiency of the projects
delivered always increases with q or p when this variable raises the average quality of the pool of
politicians, but that otherwise it has an ambiguous effect.
Increasing the quality of a court is harmful if it decreases the average ability of politicians
without exerting a sufficiently powerful effect on corruption. This state of affairs may occur be-
cause the share of accepted bribes is already very small, or because corruption is not the most
important problem (if the average ability of politicians is very low). The share of accepted bribes
unambiguously decreases with q, p and γ . Average ability is low if politics is attractive to every-
one (high wages w0, low punishment γ) or if it is attractive only to the least able (high marginal
opportunity cost w¯, good judges q). In Figure 1, cost efficiency decreases with q if q and p are
sufficiently high for corruption to be small and if w¯ is sufficiently low for the most able to enter.
In Figure 2 it decreases with p if p and q are sufficiently high for corruption to be small, and if w¯
is sufficiently high that only the least able choose to enter politics.
b. Aggregate level of corruption
It is also possible to study the rate of corruption σ , which is defined as the share of projects for
which a politician has accepted a bribe. The equilibrium probability that a project has been subject
to corruption is given by
σ = θ¯(1−G(s∗)). (13)
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The probability that a project has been subject to corruption is equal to the probability that a
politician steals when in state l, 1−G(s∗), multiplied by the expected ability of the politician,
which is equal to her probability of being in state l. The expected ability of a politician is derived
directly from Proposition 1.
Proposition 5 Courts of higher quality marginally decrease the share of procurement projects
subject to corruption if their possibly negative effect on the average ability of the pool of politicians
does not outweigh their contribution to deterring corruption,
∂ θ¯
∂ i
(1−G(s∗))≤ ∂ s
∗
∂ i
g(s∗)θ¯ , (14)
with i ∈ {q, p}.
Proof. The proof directly follows from deriving ∂σ∂q and
∂σ
∂ p , with σ defined in (13)
The right-hand side of (14) is the marginal effect of the quality of a court on the rate of corrup-
tion of each politician s∗ for a given average ability θ¯ . The left-hand side is the marginal effect on
the quality of the pool of politicians for a given s∗. If courts of higher quality improve the average
ability of politicians, this may therefore have the indirect effect of increasing corruption. In that
case, courts of lower quality may decrease corruption simply because politicians are less often able
to steal. The probability that a project is subject to corruption σ is represented in both Figure 1 and
2, with F(θ) = θ . It is easy to see that the cases in which corruption decreases the most drastically
are those in which the quality of politicians also decreases, which raises the expected cost of a
project. Since only projects carried out in state l can be subject to corruption, it always holds that
the sum of λ and σ is equal to the average ability of those who join the pool of politicians θ¯ .
A typical case corresponds to part of the right-hand side of Figure 1. For the lowest values of
q, the very least able citizens enter politics and corruption makes up a large share of politicians’
income (low p, q, high γ and w¯). Hence, better judicial courts increase the average ability of
politicians but also increase corruption. This is the only one of our examples where the so-called
tradeoff hypothesis between corruption and ability holds. While we make the assumption that, in
a given environment, the most able politicians are more often subject to corruption, we find that
there is no general tradeoff. If the corruption deterrence effect dominates the selection effects,
better courts decrease both corruption and incompetence.
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c. Judicial errors
Finally, the share of judicial errors can be easily characterized as the expected probability that a
politician is punished without having accepted a bribe. The equilibrium probability that a politician
is convicted without having engaged in corruption is given by
φ = (1−q)((1− p)λ + p(1−λ −σ)) (15)
One form of judicial error affects politicians who deliver projects at low cost (λ ), are wrong-
fully reported as having incurred high cost (1− p), and are then wrongfully convicted (1− q). A
second form involves politicians who deliver at high cost without being corrupt, (1−λ −σ ), are
correctly reported as having incurred high costs (p) and are then wrongfully convicted (1− q).
When the quality of the judicial courts increases, it has the direct effect of both decreasing the
probability of a judicial error in a given case and decreasing the probability that a given politi-
cian will accept bribes. However, if it also decreases the quality of the pool of politicians it may
actually increase the share of judicial errors by increasing the number of cases in which honest
politicians are investigated for having incurred high cost (while in state h). When the quality of
the accounting courts increases, it has the direct effects of decreasing corruption, increasing the
probability that a politician in state h is reported for high cost and decreasing the probability that a
politician in state l is so reported. Hence, the sum of the direct effects may actually be to increase
the probability of a judicial error. This effect can be either exacerbated or mitigated by the indirect
effect of p on the quality of the pool of politicians.
5 Policy
The previous sections were positive: We discussed the equilibrium and comparative statics of the
game, while taking as exogenous the parameters on which a social planner may have an influ-
ence: the quality of judges q, the quality of accounting courts p, politicians’ remuneration w0
and punishment level γ . In this section, we consider the normative question of what these values
should be depending on the objective of the social planner. We set up an initial stage of the game,
where a government chooses the parameters in order to maximize an objective function V given
the expected strategy of citizens,
max
q,p,w0,γ
V (λ ,σ ,φ). (16)
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We assume that a social planner may have an interest in three different objectives: maximizing the
share of low cost projects delivered ∂V∂λ ≥ 0, minimizing the share of projects subject to corruption
∂V
∂σ ≤ 0, and minimizing the number of judicial errors in which an innocent politician is convicted
∂V
∂φ ≤ 0. 12 We start by discussing the marginal impact of each instrument by narrowing the
analysis of the share of projects delivered at low costs λ , and then study the characteristics of a
first-best policy for a general function V . A first-best policy based on the combination of the two
courts described herein is obviously not the only one that might be conceived. The first-best can in
general be achieved by any policy that makes public officials residual claimants of the procurement
processes they manage.
It is essential to keep in mind, as suggested by Bandiera et al. (2009), that real world constraints
such as limited liability may render the first-best unfeasible. Moreover, making politicians residual
claimants would imply a perfect understanding of what a low-cost project is, something that we
argue is subject to the imperfect evaluations of accounting courts.
5.1 Impact of marginal policy changes on the share of projects delivered at low cost
In this subsection, we focus on the marginal benefit to a social planner of modifying the value of a
single parameter. While it is possible to perform the exercise for each of the parameters studied in
the previous subsections, the most obvious candidate is the share of projects that a social planner
can expect to deliver at low cost λ .
The most direct instrument to influence cost-efficiency is the remuneration of politicians, given
by w0. As w¯ is constant, increasing w0 increases the remuneration of all politicians by the same
amount. Using the results from the previous sections, it is possible to show that
∂ θˆ
∂w0
=− 1
MBθ −MCθ , (17)
and ∂ s
∗
∂w0 = 0. Hence
∂λ
∂wo ≥ 0 if and only if MBθ < MCθ . It is only if the least able citizens
choose to join the pool of politicians that increasing politicians’ salaries has a positive effect.
Otherwise, increasing salaries actually decreases the quality of the projects delivered by decreasing
the average ability of politicians. This result may help explain the conflicting evidence on the
impact of remuneration on the quality of politicians. For instance, in a country like Sweden,
where only the most able citizens become politicians (Dal Bó et al., 2017), higher wages would
only attract more politicians and decrease their average ability.
12For instance, Di Tella and Rotemberg (2016) argue that citizens may prefer politicians with lesser ability because
they see corruption as a betrayal, more problematic that simple incompetence.
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The impact of the level of punishment γ on the expected cost efficiency of projects is ambigu-
ous because its impact on the selection of politicians is ambiguous. The impact on MBθ −MCθ
is
∂MBθ
∂γ
= (1−q)(2p−1)−g(s∗)(1−G(s∗))(p+q−1). (18)
The first part is positive, as the more able politicians suffer relatively less from the higher cost of
being convicted. The second part is negative, as the loss from taking fewer bribes affects the most
able politicians disproportionately. The impact on U0 is clearly negative, ∂U0∂γ =−(1−q)p, and so
is the impact on the payoff to any type of politician. Hence, the direct effect of an increase in γ is
clearly beneficial when only the most able enter MBθ > MCθ , as it makes it possible to target the
best politicians and deter corruption, provided at least some citizens still want to enter the pool of
politicians. When the least able enter, increasing the level of punishment γ is beneficial only if the
impact on corruption outweighs the selection effect.
Finally, p and q have been largely studied in the previous subsections. It is easy to show that
∂λ
∂q ≥ 0 when
g(s∗)
γ
ch
θ¯ ≥−∂ θ¯
∂q
G(s∗). (19)
This inequality is always satisfied when ∂ θ¯∂q ≥ 0, as increasing the quality of judges decreases both
corruption and incompetence. A social planner willing to decrease the share of projects delivered
at low cost might do so by marginally increasing the quality of the judicial system provided the
benefits from deterring corruption are not offset by attracting less able politicians. As shown in
Proposition 2 this is often the case when few people are willing to enter politics, as increasing the
quality of q can have opposite effects on the average ability of politicians.
Similarly, ∂λ∂ p ≥ 0 when g(s∗) γch θ¯ ≥ − ∂ θ¯∂ p G(s∗). As shown in Proposition 3, increasing the
quality of the accounting courts is beneficial when the most able politicians enter (MBθ > MCθ )
and corruption is high, and detrimental when corruption is lower and the least able citizens enter
politics (MBθ < MCθ ).
5.2 First-best
We show in the previous section that any of the partial solutions can lead to possibly perverse
social outcomes. This section shows that to maximize any welfare function V as described in (16),
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an optimal policy must fulfill three conditions. First, a condition on the absence of corruption, so
that s∗ ≥ 1. This implies that the level of punishment should be sufficiently high,
γ ≥ ch
p+q−1 . (20)
This condition is also sufficient to ensure σ = 0. Second, a condition that ensures that only the
most able citizens enter politics, this is MBθ ≥ MCθ . Assuming condition (20) is fulfilled, this
means that the quality of the accounting court should be sufficiently high, and the quality of the
judicial courts sufficiently low,
(1−q)(2p−1)≥ w¯
γ
. (21)
If conditions (20) and (21) are satisfied, w0 should be the lowest value that satisfies u(1)≥ 0,
w0 = γ(1−q)(1− p)+ w¯. (22)
The last two conditions ensure that only the most able citizens enter politics. Hence, as there is no
corruption (by the first condition), all projects are delivered at low cost λ = 0. Finally, to ensure
the absence of judicial errors, it should be the case that at either p or q is equal to 1 or that both
are. As it is impossible to fulfill condition (21) with q = 1, w¯ > 0 and a finite value of γ , the four
conditions to be met simultaneously are p = 1, γ ≥ chq , q≤ 1− w¯γ and w0 = w¯.
An ideal policy that simultaneously fulfills these three conditions always exists and is not
unique. The following proposition offers an example.
Proposition 6 There exists a socially optimal policy where only the most able citizens θ = 1 enter
politics, there is no corruption (σ = 0, λ = 1), and no one is convicted if innocent (φ = 0). An
example of optimal policy is p = 1, q = 12 , γ > max{2ch,2w¯} and w0 = w¯.
The formal proof is in the Appendix. In the policy presented in Proposition 6, the accounting
court is able to perfectly screen the high-cost projects, and the politicians delivering at high cost
receive a sufficiently high punishment to deter corruption. The judges are replaced by a random
punishment of the high-cost projects (as q = 12 ) that punishes indistinguishably the least able and
the corrupt, which serves to deter entry of the least able. Finally, the salary paid to officeholders
is sufficiently high to attract the most able politicians even without the benefits of corruption. It
would be possible to attain the same outcome by increasing the quality of the judicial system q, the
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level of punishment γ and the remuneration of the politicians w0. As a general principle, all optimal
solutions imply a sufficiently high quality of the accounting court, a sufficiently low quality of the
judicial court, a sufficiently high level of punishment and a level of wages high enough to attract
the most able politicians but not too high, in order to avoid attracting less able ones.
In some sense, this first best is an application to our setup of a simple incentive contract, in
which the politician is made a residual claimant of the procurement project (so that greater ability
is an advantage), and the participation constraint is binding for the most able citizens only. This
first best thus relies on the unlikely assumption that politicians are not subject to limited liability
and are risk neutral. As implied by Bandiera et al. (2009), this assumption may be sufficient to
question the feasibility of this first best.
6 Robustness checks
This section returns to some of the assumptions of the model. First we assess the relevance of
considering the possibility of campaign costs when voters screen the ability of politicians. Second,
we study asymmetric errors in courts’ assessments by permitting a change in the severity of the
courts for a given assessment quality. Third, we relax the assumption that more able politicians are
also more able at extracting rents from corruption. Fourth, we relax the assumption of homogeneity
in the preferences for corruption across politicians. We present here the main results from these
extensions, and provide the full development in the online Appendix.
6.1 Campaign costs and voters’ ability to screen politicians
In this subsection, we extend the setup to explicitly model elections, following the citizen-candidate
model used in Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Besley and Coate (1997), Caselli and Morelli (2004)
and Poutvaara and Takalo (2007).
In the first stage, citizens simultaneously decides whether or not to become candidate. In
our notation, this decision is captured by the strategy E ∈ { j,n j}, and a citizen playing j is a
“candidate.” We also add to our initial setup that campaigning has a fixed cost. In the second
stage, voters elect a share of the candidates, using a common imperfect observable signal of their
ability. In the traditional citizen-candidate models politicians are of discrete types. As we work
with a continuum of types and want to stick as much as possible to the traditional model, we
assume voters observe a signal θa ∈ {a, a¯}, denoting respectively high (a) or low (a¯) ability. We
further assume that the probability of being observed as a high type ωa(θ) is strictly increasing in
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the type of the politician, ∂ωa∂θ > 0, so that the signal is at least somehow informative of the ability
of the politician. A particular case (used by Poutvaara and Takalo, 2007) is that a candidate of type
θi has a probability θi of sending a high signal, with ∂ωa∂θ = 1. We also assume that the utility of
citizens strictly increases with the share of projects delivered at low cost λ , so that in equilibrium
citizens voting sincerely randomize with equal probability among all the candidates observed as
high type a. Hence, in equilibrium only candidates observed as high type have votes cast for their
names. If too many (or not enough) candidates have votes, the ties are broken randomly.
We find that a good quality of the signal observed by voters can be enough to convince more
able citizens to enter politics even if MBθ < MCθ . This is because the probability that the cost of
campaigning is wasted is lower for the most able candidates. In that sense, better-informed voters
solve a large part of the selection problem. The impact of the cost of campaigning is ambiguous.
A higher cost means that campaigning is more expensive for everyone. Hence, if the pool of
candidates is composed of the most able citizens, a higher cost of campaigning always increases
the quality of the pool. However, if the candidates are the least able citizens and if the threshold
politician is above the average type, an increase in the cost of campaigning actually decreases the
quality of the pool of politicians (and of the elected politicians).
6.2 Asymmetric errors in court assessments and court severity
In the main part of the paper, we define the quality of accounting and judicial courts by p and q
respectively. When we refer to “better courts” we thus have in mind more resources for the judicial
system, resources that symmetrically decrease the number of false positives and false negatives in
court rulings. An alternative view could be to consider the “severity” of a court. Denote by ph|h the
probability of an accounting court correctly reporting a high cost and pl|l correctly reporting a low
cost. Similarly, qg|g is the probability of a judicial court correctly reporting corruption and qng|ng
correctly reporting no corruption. Without any further assumptions, more severe courts means that
the probability of being reported as high cost ph|. or guilty pg|. increases.
We find that the threshold at which a politician starts accepting bribes remains independent
of her type. As the probability of being in a high state is higher for the high types, it therefore
remains true that high types benefit more from corruption. More severe judges therefore decrease
the advantage of being a high type - as in the main model - if and only if they deter corruption
for a given pool of politicians. What is necessary is that the probability of being reported as
guilty when innocent does not increase much more than the probability of being reported as guilty
when actually guilty. If judges become so severe that the difference in the probability of being
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found guilty when guilty and when innocent decreases too much, then more severe judges increase
corruption for a given pool of politicians.
6.3 Decoupling the ability to benefit from corruption from the ability to deliver at
low cost
An important assumption of our main model is that corruption implies delivering at high cost a
project that could otherwise have been delivered at low cost. This implies that politicians of greater
ability find more ways to benefit from corruption. In this subsection, we consider a variant of the
model in which the ability to benefit from corruption is completely independent from general
competence. This could correspond to cases in which corruption consists simply of the passive
action of accepting a bribe, or if the skills required to be good at corruption and good at delivering
procurement projects are mutually independent.
Consider the following modification of the main model. A politician knows her type θi but,
before learning the cost of a project, is offered the possibility of corruption with some probability.
If she accepts corruption, the benefit is as before. If she refuses corruption, the actual cost is
realized, cl = 0 with probability θi and ch otherwise. Thus, the choice to accept corruption or not
is not the same for all abilities. By refusing corruption, the more able politicians are less likely to
be found guilty, while the less able politicians more often take the risk of delivering at high cost
and being erroneously convicted by a judge. Hence, the less able politicians are the most likely to
accept corruption.
It is possible to show that better judicial courts have an ambiguous impact on the marginal
benefit of being of high ability. This is because better judges protect low types (as before), but
also decrease their benefits from corruption. As the low types are more likely to accept corruption,
the impact is not unambiguously negative, as it is in the main model, depending on which effect
dominates. Regarding accounting courts, a higher p always increases the marginal benefit of being
a high type. As in the main model, it increases the advantage of being more able conditional on not
stealing. Unlike in the main model, its lowering of corruption affects low types disproportionately.
6.4 Preference for corruption
Finally, consider the possibility that not all citizens have the same preference for corruption. As-
sume that each citizen i is characterized by an ability θi as before, but also a discount factor δi
on revenue from corruption. A factor δi = 1 denotes a politician who has no moral problem with
corruption (as in the main model), while δi = 0 is a perfectly honest politician.
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If δi is correlated with ability, this effect needs to be taken into account. In particular, if
politicians of low ability are also more intrinsically dishonest, δi is negatively correlated with
θi, so that s∗i increases with θi. The most able politicians are more often in a position to accept
bribes (because they are more competent) but accept a smaller proportion of the bribes offered to
them (because they are more honest). If this effect is sufficiently high, it is possible that less able
politicians benefit more from corruption even if they are less likely to find themselves in a position
to do so. In that case, the impact of q on MBθ becomes ambiguous: better judges protect the least
able politicians as in the main model, but decreasing corruption may affect them more negatively.
7 Conclusion
This model is a first attempt to examine the role of judicial and accounting courts in efforts to
reduce cost inefficiencies resulting from distorted procurement processes. A contribution of the
paper is to disentangle the respective impact of corruption and incompetence on public procure-
ment to suggest how courts might best use the information available to them to distinguish between
the two factors as cost drivers.
Two insights stand out. The first is that policies designed to improve procurement outcomes
have an impact on the types of individuals who enter politics (or become political appointees) and
that this, in turn, affects procurement outcomes. This explains why a policy designed to strengthen
a specific court responsible for monitoring procurement processes may have positive or negative
effects on the cost-efficiency of those processes – for example, over time the presence of the
court may lower the quality of the pool of politicians. This is a testable prediction: comparing a
country in which politicians are of low ability relative to the general population to a country in
which they are of high ability, the impact of common policies adopted to improve procurement,
such as budgetary allocations to judicial or accounting courts or a change in the remuneration of
politicians, should be different.
The second important policy insight is that fighting corruption in order to improve the effi-
ciency of procurement processes can be misleading. Our model does not necessarily predict a
tradeoff between corruption and competence: Policies designed to improve the pool of politicians
may decrease corruption and improve cost efficiency in some cases but make matters worse in
others. More specifically, our model predicts that, in situations where corruption is an important
source of income for politicians, focusing on identifying dishonest politicians without performing
comprehensive cost assessments may appear efficient, as it decreases the share of corrupt projects,
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but such a focus may actually raise overall costs by driving the most talented politicians away,
leaving those of lesser skill supervising procurement.
As shown in Section 6, these two insights are affected differentially at the margin by alterna-
tive modelling assumptions. They also deserve further analysis to account for several real-world
circumstances. We highlight six such circumstances that may affect our broad conclusions. These
represent potential areas for further research.
First, while in our model, corruption is completely determined by the behaviour of the politi-
cian, in practice, it is also influenced by the firms executing the contract. As suggested by Auriol
et al. (2016), the possibility of corruption in public procurement affects the quality of entrepreneurs
applying for these contracts. One of the benefits of fighting corruption should be, then, that fewer
firms offer bribes. This might be because firms are deterred from offering bribes by the increased
risk of being found out. Or it might be because of changes in the self-selecting pool of firms elect-
ing to participate in public procurements. These changes would affect the scope for corruption
among politicians in our model as well as the bargaining power of the two sides of the market.
Second, in many countries, politicians have a say in the staffing of judicial and accounting
courts. Moreover, in some countries, courts may themselves be players of the game and get in-
volved in choosing the policy options rather than simply focusing on measuring costs and mon-
itoring noncompliance. For instance, if auditors have a clear political affiliation, this may give
politicians some margin for setting the standards of cost assessments. Similar observations can be
made about political factors in court appointments (including appointments to the supreme courts
of the United States or Spain, for instance) and in the definition of guidelines on conflict of interest
to be applied to judges. Such political factors open the door to deal-making and other forms of
distortion not picked up by our model.
Third, we ignore the possibility that politicians may bribe the courts. In that case, giving more
power to courts by increasing the level of punishment they are able to mete out may simply trans-
late into higher bargaining power for the court to use to extort rents from politicians. Moreover,
if more skillful politicians are also more able to fool the courts, they may benefit even more from
corruption: first because they are more often in a position to extract rents, and second because their
probability of being caught will be lower. It would therefore make sense to look into the impact
of political influence on the role and effectiveness of judicial and accounting courts. Besley and
Coate (2003) develop this idea by contrasting direct elections of regulators with political appoint-
ment, but more work is probably needed to refine the assessment of the scope and limits of these
courts in reducing moral hazard and adverse selection in public procurement processes.
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Fourth, we ignore the possibility that politicians may avoid committing to anything which
could negatively affect their performance. This would also bias procurement outcomes and possi-
bly reduce public sector performance in yet another way. Unless voters put pressure on candidates
to take a transparent position on the choices they make, it is very likely that the political agenda
will be manipulated by the politicians, whether corrupt or incompetent, and that the cost and over-
all effectiveness of public procurement processes will be negatively affected.
Fifth, we assume that the probability of being in a position to deliver a project at low cost is
exogenous. If being in such a position were the consequence of politicians’ effort, and if effort
is less costly for the most able politicians, the general idea that the latter will exert more effort
and have more opportunities for corruption would hold. In that case, the impact of better judges
would be to decrease the level of effort, because (i) a marginal amount of extra effort would be
less likely to decrease the probability of judicial error and (ii) bribes would be less often accepted.
The impact of better accounting courts is ambiguous, as (i) politicians who deliver projects at high
cost are more often victims of judicial mistakes and (ii) bribes are less often accepted. Just as in
the rest of the paper, the selection effects will depends on whether MB > MC and whether the
marginal politician is made better or worse off.
Finally, we assume the quality of the courts to be independent of the number of cases they treat.
For a given budget, judges may however make less precise assessments if the number of projects
reported at a high cost increases. Hence, when more incompetent citizens become politicians,
the number of cases reported at a high cost increases, and the precision of the assessment by
judges decreases. This in turn makes politics relatively more attractive to high ability citizens, as
it reduces the protection of incompetence by the judicial system, and increases the incentives for
corruption.
These observations illustrate the difficulty of coming up with a holistic view of the interactions
between court institutions and procurement outcomes. But they also imply that we are likely to
have simply underestimated the role of courts, both their scope and their limits, as drivers of pro-
curement outcomes. This actually reinforces our main message. In public procurement, as in many
policy issues, good intentions in the design of institutions and in the choice of instruments based
on intuition have their limits. Unless complex interactions are accounted for, good intentions can
lead to perverse effects. In the context of this paper, good intentions, simplistically implemented,
distort the pool of politicians from which voters can choose; and from that point on, they can work
against the public service goals that public procurement processes are expected to deliver.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. To find sˆ one needs to find the smallest value of s such that stealing is preferred to not
stealing, solving
sch− γ pq≥−γ(1−q)(1− p). (23)
As s ∈ {0,1}, we also need to look for corner solutions. As the support of s is [0,1], s∗ = 1
whenever sˆ≥ 1. There is no corner solution s = 0 as sˆ≥ 0 for all p,q≥ 12 .
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. The sign of MBθ −MCθ determines the direction of the inequality. If MBθ > MCθ , equa-
tion (3) can be rewritten as
θ ≥ −U0( j)
MBθ −MCθ = θˆ . (24)
If MBθ < MCθ , equation (3) can be rewritten as
θ ≤ −U0( j)
MBθ −MCθ = θˆ . (25)
We also need to define θ− = max{θˆ ,0} and θ+ = min{θˆ ,1} in order to take into account corner
solutions, as θ ∈ [0,1].
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. If θˆ ∈ (0,1) has an interior solution, the quality of politician decreases with the quality of
the signal sent by judges if ∂ θˆ∂q ≤ 0, as it makes the pool of politicians less selective if MBθ > MCθ
and more selective otherwise. It is easy to show that ∂ θˆ∂q ≤ 0 if and only if
−∂U0( j)
∂q
(MBθ −MCθ )+ ∂MBθ∂q (U0( j))≤ 0. (26)
If θˆ ∈ (0,1), it must be that (−U0( j)) and (MBθ−MCθ ) are of identical sign. Hence, (26) rewrites
∂MBθ/∂q
MBθ −MCθ ≥
∂U0( j)/∂q
U0( j)
, (27)
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where θˆ = −U0( j)MBθ−MCθ . If θˆ /∈ (0,1), the statement is trivial has either all or no citizen enter the pool
of politicians depending on the value of U0( j).
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. There is no corruption if and only if s∗ ≥ 1, which using Lemma 1 and p = 1, q = 12
simplifies to γ ≥ 2ch. Only the most able citizens choose to enter when MBθ > MCθ , which, when
s∗ = 1, p = 1 and q = 12 simplifies to γ > 2w¯. Finally, when s
∗ = 1, p = 1 and q = 12 the most able
politician θ = 1 prefers to join the pool of politicians if and only if w0 ≥ w¯.
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